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THE CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA





ARTICLE 16, ARTICLE 100, AND
SCHEDULE 5
SIDNEY L HARRING*
Schedule 5 of the Constitution of Namibia provides that 'all property of
which the ownership or control immediately prior to the date of
Independence' was vested in the Government of South West Africa 'shall
vest in the Government of Namibia'. More extensive provisions go on to
define this as including any kind of property interest, any trust, and 'any
right or iriterest therein'. Article 100, under the title 'Sovereign
Ownership of Natural Resource', provides that: 'Land, water and
natural resources below and above the surface of the land ... shall
belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned.' The
Government of Namibia takes the position that this language gives it the
ownership of communal lands.! All governmental policy relating to
communal lands stems from this state 'ownership'. Prime Minister Hage
Geingob has gone further when, relying on Art 100, he stated that 'people
in the communal lands (some 65 to 70 per cent of the population) have no
acknowledged right, independent-of the will of the State, to live and farm
in the Communal Areas'. 2 This asserted legal position, that the State
'owns' the communal lands and could therefore dispossess at will 70 per
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law.
I 'Legal Opinion: Legal Position Relating to Land Occupied in Namibia on a Communal Basis'
Adv PC van der Byl, for the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, (1992) 67-8.
This opinion was prepared for the official purpose of determining the legal ownership of
communal lands in Namibia, along with other purposes.
2 Hage Geingob, 'Prime Minister's Address', National Conference on Land Reform and the Land
Question, Consensus Document, July 199 1, Office of the Prime Minister, Windhoek, 12.
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cent of the Namibian population, 3 is wrong for a number of reasons.
1. COLONIAL AND APARTHEID ERA SEIZURE OF NATIVE LAND
Native4 land in Namibia and South Africa was generally seized by
colonial authorities without compensation.5 Surely there is no need here
to cite South African or British colonial law for the proposition that the
Crown 'owns' native land. Among the most infamous cases in the
common-law world is a southern African case, Re Southern Rhodesia
upholding the summary dispossession of the Ndebele from their lands in
Matabeleland 6:
'The estimation of the rights of Aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult. Some
tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usage's and conceptions of
rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of
civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people
some shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute it into the substance
of transferable rights of property as we know them.'
7
No court in the world today would give effect to such legal reasoning, but
it is precisely such reasoning that made native land 'crown land' in
southern Africa.
8
3 The proposition has never been tested in the courts of Namibia, but would probably be accepted
by most lawyers. The Legal Assistance Centre takes the same position as the government,
stating that 'the Namibian Constitution clearly transfers ownership of all the communal lands
which previously vested in any governmental authority ... to the Government of Namibia ...
Thus, after a confusing history of reservation and ownership, it seems clear that the ownership
of all the land in Namibia (that) has been set aside for "native" occupation over the years now
vests in the Government of Namibia' Legal Assistance Centre, 'Communal Lands in Namibia:
The Legal Framework, Its Application, and Existing Practices' Republic of Namibia, National
Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question, Windhoek, 25 June - I July, 1991, Office
of the Prime Minister, vol 1, 61-97, at 71-72.
4 There are always difficulties of language when referring to tribal peoples. The early land laws
used the term 'native' and I have often stuck to that usage. I have also used 'black' and 'tribal'
where appropriate, but recognize that there are problems with each of these terms.
5 There is a large literature on the process of the alienation of Native land in Southern Africa and
around the world. See Robin Palmer Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (1977); Sol T
Plaatje Native Life in South Africa (1987); Colin Bundy The Rise and Fall of the South African
Peasantry (1989); William Miller Macmillan Bantu. Boer, and Briton: The Making of the South
African Native Problem (1983).
6 [1919] AC 211 CD 7509. Southern Rhodesia, Papers relating to a Reference to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council on the Question of the Ownership of Land in Southern Rhodesia
(1914). The context of the case is discussed in Robin Palmer op cit note 5.
7 Re Southern Rhodesia at 233-234.
8 The leading common-law case on not giving effect to such racist and colonial decisions is Mabo
v State of Queensland 107 ALR ](1992). Among other holdings, Mabo requires that native title
to communal lands must be determined by reference to traditional laws and customs, and not
merely to colonial legal processes that native people did not have access to. Brennan J at 38-51;
Dean and Gaudron JJ at 64-71 (both majority opinions.) Mabo is directly on point throughout
in relation to the communal land issue in Namibia. Because of the lack of constitutional
jurisprudence in Namibia, Namibian courts routinely make reference to applicable constitu-
tional cases from other jurisdictions. Gino Naldi Constitutional Rights in Namibia (1995) 29.
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While Adolf Luderitz purchased the original German lands from the
Nama, the rest of the native lands in Namibia passed into white hands
through a wide range of different processes, including private sale, lease,
treaties, war and genocide.9 The fact of the agreements and the wars,
however, proves that the lands of Namibia were not 'terra nullius', vacant
lands that automatically became the 'property' of their discoverer.
However acquired, all of this theft of land was probably 'legal' under
German, British, and South African law, but there are serious problems
with asserting this legality as the present basis of Namibian governmental
ownership of communal lands. Indeed, the early British authorities in
South West Africa authored a Report on the Natives of South West Africa
and Their Treatment by Germany, explicitly to prove that the German's
had brutalized the native people of the country and deprived them of
their lands.' 0 While no modern authority would cite these seizures of
native land as either legal, or justifying modern Namibian land law, the
fact is that these land seizures are the modern basis of the idea that the
state 'owns' Crown land, and the derivative idea that communally held
land is a form of Crown land."
There can be no question that tribal peoples held land in complex land
tenure arrangements that included clear recognition of individual or
family rights to use certain parcels of land. Legal anthropologist Martin
Chanock has exposed the myth of 'communal' land-holding as the
convenient product of colonial legal systems that needed to define native
land tenure as something other than 'individual' ownership., 2 Numerous
studies make it clear that native people inherited land rights as
definite as European land rights. 13 Native land was not 'communal land'
9 Robert Gordon The Bushman Myth: The Making of a Namibian Underclass (1992); Horst
Drechsler Let Us Die Fighting, (1980); United Nations Institute for Namibia: Namibia:
Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (1986) 31.
10 Report on the Natives of South West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany London: HMSO,
1918.
I1 There is a complex colonial law that governs title to land seized in colonial enterprises.
Namibia was largely (but not entirely) seized by Germany through conquest. Conquerors were
obligated to recognize the private property rights of white citizens but, at common law, took
title to all state property. Since African tribes did not fit easily into Eurocentric models,
communal lands were seized by colonial authorities as 'Crown lands'. Since most often this
seizure was in theory only, that is no direct exercise of dominion was exercised, it was many
years later, after colonial power was consolidated, before native people were even aware that
they had lost title to their communal lands.
12 Martin Chanock 'Paradigms, Policies and Property: A Review of the Customary Law of Land
Tenure' in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds) Law in Colonial Africa (1991) 61-84, and
'A Peculiar Sharpness: An Essay on Property in the History of Customary Law in Africa'
(1991) 32 (1) Journal of African History 65-88.
13 AP Cheater 'Fighting Over Property: The Articulation of Dominant and Subordinate Legal
Systems Governing the Inheritance of Immovable Property Among Blacks in Zimbabwe'
(1987) 57 (2) Africa, 173-96; Elizabeth Colson 'The Impact of the-Colonial Period on the
Definition of Land Rights' in Victor Turner (ed) Colonialism in Africa (1971) 193-215; Sally
Falk Moore 'From Giving and Lending to Selling: Property Transactions Reflecting Historical
Changes on Kilimanjaro' in Mann & Roberts (eds) op cit note 12.
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until colonial authorities defined away all other forms of native land
tenure. 14
Various South African statutes, going back to 1913 and before,
provide for government 'ownership' of communal lands. Presumably all
of these statutes were valid under South African law. The Representative
Authorities Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG 8 of 1980), s 48bis
was the last of these measures, and it is this measure that provides the
basis for the Namibian government's ownership of tribal communal
lands. The Act created the homelands in Namibia. Up to that time,
Namibian communal lands had been administered under the Bantu Trust
and Land Act (1936) (Act No 18 of 1936).
15
The original Crown Land Disposal Proclamation, 1920 (Proclamation
13 of 1920) extended the Crown Land Disposal Ordinance, 1903, of the
Transvaal to South West Africa. Nothing more need be said about the
details of these laws: the 'ownership of native land' was not only seized by
colonial authorities as part of a racist regime of domination and
deprivation, but native people were forbidden to own land in fee simple
16
in 'white' areas, covering most of South Africa, later extended to South
West Africa. 17
Article 140 of the Constitution provides for a continuity of the rule of
law after independence by stating that 'subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, all laws which were in force immediately before the date of
independence shall remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of
Parliament or until they are declared unconstitutional by a competent
Court'. This provision leaves all of the racist apartheid era laws of South
Africa part of the law of Namibia until the National Assembly or the
courts either change the law or hold the law unconstitutional. It seems
obvious, therefore, that some portion of the original law in force in
Namibia at independence was unconstitutional.
14 TW Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) 384-96. See
also Chanock op cit note 12 (in both cites).
15 Here it should be obvious that I have deliberately avoided a detailed statutory interpretation of
the various land laws currently operating in Namibia because they are substantially irrelevant
to my analysis, which focuses on the meaning of Schedule 5 within the broader framework of
constitutional interpretation. This does not mean to deny the importance of this work in other
contexts, nor that others may have different interpretations of the meaning of those land laws
under Schedule 5.
16 Editor's note: Fee simple is an American and English common law property term which in its
absolute form means 'an estate limited absolutely to a person and his or her heirs and assigns
without limitation or condition. An absolute or fee-simple estate is one in which the owner is
entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition during one's life, and
descending to one's heirs and legal representatives upon one's death intestate. Such estate is
unlimited as to duration, disposition, and descendibility'. Black's Law Dictionary 6 ed (1990)
615. Other limited forms of fee simple include fee simple conditional, fee simple defeasible, fee
simple determinable. The closest translation for South African property law would probably be
ownership or dominium.
17 Bundy op cit note 5 at 221-36; AJ Christopher The Atlas of Apartheid (1994) shows the facial
basis of land allocation in both South Africa (at 32-33) and South West Africa, (180-184).
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Of course, any law under the Constitution, no matter how blatantly
racist or offensive, is not unconstitutional until a Court holds it to be so.
A more difficult question, however, is what happens when two
constitutional provisions conflict with one another. No provision of the
Constitution, like Schedule 5 providing for the government ownership of
communal lands, can be 'unconstitutional'. Rather, when any provision
is ambiguous or two or more provisions of the Constitution are prima
facie inconsistent then a competent court must resolve the conflict by
looking to the document as a whole and the political system it envisages.
II. SCHEDULE 5, ARTICLE 100, AND COMMUNAL LANDS
Two arguments exist which limit the scope of Schedule 5 and Art 100 in
relation to communal lands. The most basic is that Schedule 5 and Art
100 provisions in so far as they are applied to communal lands are
inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution, specifically Art 16
and Art 10 fundamental rights to property and equality. The second,
while it might concede at least 'control' of communal lands to the
government, would impose on the government a duty to administer the
communal lands for the benefit of the native population that lives there.
Therefore, even if the government 'controls' or even 'owns' communal
lands, the people who live there have common law or natural law
property rights to that land that the government must protect. The
government has a kind of trust relationship with those lands. In this
analysis actual ownership of the land, while never irrelevant, is not of
great importance since the government cannot dispose of those lands
without carrying out its trust obligation to the people who live there.
A The Inconsistency of Government Ownership of Communal Lands with
Fundamental Rights Provisions of the Constitution.
The preamble of Namibia's Constitution tells us that the Constitution
cannot be understood outside of the context of the country's war against
colonialism, racism, and apartheid. It creates an interpretive context for
all of the language that follows. Although it cannot itself define the
meaning of substantive rights, the preamble remains a powerful
analytical device. Indeed, it has been described as 'an important internal
aid to the construction of provisions of the constitution, particularly
where those articles are ambiguous, but not restricted to articles which
are ambiguous'.18 Armed with the preamble, one might well feel
confident that the Constitution must be understood to preclude any
bold assertion of the primacy of white colonial property rights over the
traditional or communal property rights of native people.
18 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmH), quoted in Naldi op cit note 8 at 28.
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1. The Meaning of Article 16: A Fundamental Right to 'All Forms of
Property '
The natural law and public policy language of the preamble, when read in
connection with Article 16, protecting the right of 'all persons' to
'acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable
property individually or in association with others. . .' must protect the
traditional or communal property rights of black people in the same way
that it protects the fee simple property rights of white people. Article 16 is
intended to apply broadly to all forms of property rights, and that must
include 'all' property rights short of fee simple ownership, as well as fee
simple ownership. 19 An interest in communal lands, grounded in
traditional customary law must be understood to be a property interest
under the common law.
To hold otherwise is inconsistent with the broad provisions of the
Constitution providing for racial equality (Art 10). Black people's
property rights must be protected at the same level as white people's
property rights. Under the colonial and the apartheid regimes, black
people's right to fee simple ownership of land was severely restricted:
black people, even if they had the financial resources, could not purchase
farm lands on the open market. Broad communal lands were set aside for
black people as a specific alternative to fee simple ownership as part of an
overall apartheid era governmental scheme that included the allocation of
all property rights to land into one ownership scheme or another, black
or white. The Constitution must require as strong a protection of black
people's rights to their property interest, whether divided or undivided,
whether in trust, as part of some communal entity known as a tribe,
band, or family, or in any other form.
There is also precedent in both the common law and South African law
that native people's property rights are accorded a legal status, even if less
than fee simple ownership. Some South African courts held that while
tribes might have an absolute or alloidal title to land (depending on the
particular colonial legal status of that land) individual members of a tribe
had only a 'usufructuary' right. 20 This 'usufructuary' right was a Roman
law principle seized upon by the Privy Council in Attorney General of
Ontario v St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company, the most
elaborate and detailed nineteenth century common law aboriginal land
19 The opposite of 'alliforms-of property' would appear to be simply 'private property'. Yet, it is
clear that even 'privateproperty' refers to a wide range of property rights, and is not limited to
any specific form of 'lawful' ownership of property. For one discussion of this see Jeremy
Waldron The Right to Private Property (1988).
20 Noveliti v Ntwayi 2 NAC 170 (1911); Dyasi 1935 NAC (C&O) I at 9; Gaboetloeloe v Tsikwe
1945 NAC (C&O) 2; cf Luke 4 NAC 133 (1920). An official SWAPO document, Namibia:
Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development, (Lusaka: United Nations Institute
for Namibia, 1986) refers to the communal land tenure system as one in which 'the legal rights
are usually usufruct, impermanent and governed by customary law' (at 133).
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title case. 21 The case concerned the inherent land title of a tribe of
Saulteaux Ojibway Indians in Canada to unsurrendered aboriginal land.
While the Privy Council held that the Crown had the absolute title to
aboriginal lands as Crown land, the tribes had underlying legal rights,
usufructuary rights, to use that land. This interest in the land was good
against all except the Crown, and represented a legal interest in the land.
The judgment of the Privy Council, the highest legal authority in the
British Empire, was binding throughout the Empire, including South
Africa after 1888 and in South West Africa after 1919.22
The precise nature of any individual's or tribe's communal property
interest need not be defined in order for Art 16 to be effective: it is
sufficient simply that there exists any property interest at all, no matter
what its nature. A 'usufructuary right', therefore, is a property right fully
actionable under the law. We must, at the same time, remember that there
were no colonial land offices extant for the purpose of recording tribal or
communal interests in land.2 3
This distinction in legal status of land ownership derives completely
from colonialism and apartheid, a legal regime that reserved land
ownership to whites and prohibited it to blacks. This same regime then
legally defined white property rights as rights held in fee simple,
according to British and Roman-Dutch legal principles, and denied an
equivalent property right, held customarily in the form of communal
lands, under various African principles of law, to land held communally
by black people. Since the Constitution directly recognizes this, referring
in the preamble to the legal rights denied by apartheid, and was created
explicitly to end this discrimination, it must follow that the pre-existing
tribal land law under which black people held land communally must be
constitutionally recognized, and accorded a legal status at least the equal
of Roman Dutch or common-law principles.
This conclusion also follows from the logic of the derivative 'just
compensation' provision of Art 16(2). All property may be expropriated
by the State for any public benefit, subject to the principle of just
compensation. Unless communal lands are protected under this
provision, it necessarily means that all property owned in fee simple
can only be acquired by the State at very high cost, an additional
protection of largely white property rights that is purely economic. Any
political measure to secure property substantially belonging to whites has
21 [1885] 10 OR 196; [18861 13 OAR 148; [1887] 13 SCR 577; [1888] 14 AC 46.
22 Ken McNeil Common Law Aboriginal Title (1989) is the best general survey of the law of
aboriginal title.
23 This lack of any legal record of the precise nature of the early land transactions gives rise to a
reverse usufruct thesis that Native tribes only leased but never sold their lands to white settlers,
therefore it is the colonizers who have the usufructuary title and the tribes who hold absolute
title. See, for example, Frieda-Nela Williams Pre-colonial Communities of Southwestern Africa:
A History of the Oivambo Kingdoms, 1600-1920. (National Archives of Namibia, 1989) 147
(referring to colonial title to valuable agricultural lands in the Grootfontein-Otavi region).
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an added economic cost. It forces the government to add an extra
measure of thought and resources to any such scheme. If communal lands
are not 'property' under Art 16(2) then they are not subject to the
principle of just compensation, and the State can engage in encroach-
ments on this property, entirely black property, with only political costs
at issue, and without added economic cost.
2. Article 100: Land Not 'Lawfully' Owned
Article 100 can be approached in several ways. But, however Art 100 is
approached, it emerges as a highly confused and ambiguous statement of
state ownership of communal lands. The simplest approach is to
recognize that the whole provision only applies to land that is 'not
otherwise lawfully owned'. If Art 16 property rights are extended to
communal lands, then they are 'otherwise lawfully owned' and there is no
conflict.
Obviously, there is another interpretation of the term, one that
narrowly applies to land owned in fee simple, with title legally recorded.24
The term 'lawfully owned' cannot be used in this narrow sense to refer to
the formal requirements of land title that were legally unavailable to
black people under apartheid. Indeed, this is the only place the term
'lawfully owned' is used in the Constitution. It is not used in Article 16 to
define property rights, nor in Schedule 5, two places where property
rights are more specifically, and more broadly defined. The Namibian
Constitution was written in 1989 at a time when native land title was
recognized as a 'lawful' title in liberal democratic countries. Therefore, it
would seem that when the Constitution defined property rights, those
rights were cast in broad terms. Even if they were not cast in such broad
terms through such an interpretation, it would seem to follow from the
abolition of apartheid that a narrow apartheid era 'lawful ownership'
definition cannot be the only one incorporated into the Constitution of
Namibia.
Support for this position comes from the location of Art 100 within the
Constitution. It is located in Chapter 11, 'Principles of State Policy'.
These directive principles, like those found in the Indian Constitution, are
declared by Art 101 to 'not of and by themselves ... be legally
enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide the Government in
making and applying laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of
said principles. . .' These 'principles' are not only specifically inferior to
'rights and freedoms', but are 'not of and by themselves enforceable by
any Court'.
24 The Government of Namibia has used the term 'lawfully owned' in this context, contrasting
the 'lawfully owned' commercial farming areas, with the communal lands. Hage Geingob
'Prime Minister's Address', National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question,
Consensus Document, July 1991, Office of the Prime Minister, 12.
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3. Schedule 5: The Constitution's Definition of Precisely What South
African State Property Vests in the Government of Namibia
The interrelationship between Art 100 and Schedule 5 also presents a
problem of interpretation. Since Schedule 5 is intended to specify which
South African state property vests in the Government of Namibia, the
provision in Art 100 providing for state ownership of land is redundant
unless there existed some category of land not 'under the ownership or
control' of the Government of South Africa that was 'not otherwise
lawfully owned'. It would seem obvious that this strained reading cannot
have been intended. The more compelling reading of the relationship
between Art 100 and Schedule 5 is that the land ownership provision of
Art 100 must be interpreted consistently with the much more detailed
definition of the broader term, 'property' in Schedule 5, a schedule
specifically set out to define what property vests in the state. Schedule 5's
broad definition of property in para (2), 'movable and immovable
property, whether corporeal or incorporeal, . . . and shall include any
right or interest therein' clearly includes land, as well as any right or
interest in land short of actual fee simple ownership. Thus, Schedule 5 is
drafted to transfer to the Government of Namibia land rights of less than
a fee simple ownership 'owned or controlled' by the Government of
South Africa.
Schedule 5 must also be read consistently with the structure of the
Constitution. A schedule cannot add or subtract substantive rights set
forth in other parts of the Constitution. The eight schedules of the
Namibian Constitution serve what are basically 'housekeeping' functions
attendant to implementing the Constitution. Three of the eight schedules
of the Namibian Constitution specify the language of the oaths of
government officials. One specifies the design of the flag. One specifies
procedures for electing the first National Assembly. The last repeals a
number of South African statutes otherwise in effect in Namibia. None of
these matters was constitutionally necessary: all could have simply been
adopted by statute immediately upon the convening of the National
Assembly. They were included in the Constitution because they were
urgent.
In this context Schedule 5 should be read as nothing more than a
housekeeping measure defining the scope of the transfer of extensive
governmental property from South Africa to Namibia, mostly lands and
buildings held for governmental purposes. Schedule 5 is not a complete
legal definition of the law of any form of property, communal or
otherwise, for constitutional purposes, equal to Art 16, although it can be
used for interpretive purposes. Therefore, Schedule 5 can neither define,
nor define away communal or any other property rights protected under
Art 16. Rather, it defines fully which South African state property 'vests'
in the Government of Namibia.
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4. Resolving the Conflict Between Art 16, Art 100, and Schedule 5
Any of the apartheid era laws that structure racist or unequal
relationships within Namibia may be challenged as unconstitutional
under Art 10's equality provisions. However, principles of national
reconciliation impose some limits on bold interpretations of this
overriding principle. Some of the vestiges of apartheid were embodied
in the Namibian Constitution in order to promote other national values,
or to reflect the spirit of compromise present when diverse political forces
sit down together in a constitution-making process. Among the most
obvious of these vestiges is the fact that whites own almost all of the land
in Namibia, and these property rights are at the core of the protections
guaranteed in Art 16. It would have been impossible to agree on a
Constitution for Namibia without the protection of these unequal
property rights.
Nothing in the recognition of parallel property rights in communal
lands undermines the principles that protect existing (primarily white)
property rights in Art 16. Rather, Art 16 specifically protects all forms of
property, including property interests less or other than real property in
fee simple. The plain meaning rule requires that interpreters of the
Constitution give full effect to the plain meaning of the words 'all persons
shall have the right to ... own ... all forms of immovable and moveable
property'. Similarly, the wording of a constitutional document is to be
given a 'wide and liberal meaning'.2 5 The words 'all forms of property'
are absolutely clear and can mean nothing else than 'all forms of
property'. Property held under customary, traditional, trust, or other
legal forms have a long legal history in Namibia, Southern Africa, the
rest of Africa as well as Roman-Dutch and common-law regimes.
Every major scholarly work on the social, economic, and political
systems of the peoples of Africa includes some reference to their form of
customary land holding.26 These are clearly 'forms of property' in
African customary law and are incorporated into the British common
law. This property ownership is also recognized in Roman-Dutch law,
although every one must recognize that fifty years of apartheid legislation
warped and distorted the principles of Roman-Dutch law. 27 While the
25 The Rehoboth Baster Gemeente and Johannes Gerard Adolf Diegaardt v The Government of the
Republic of Namibia High Court of Namibia 26 May 1995, unreported at 25. Naldi op cit note
8, argues that the bill of rights provisions of Chapter Three should be read as 'expressing values
and ideals which are consonant with the most enlightened view of a democratic society existing
under law, . . in light of the liberal democratic values expressed in the preamble' (at 28).
26 Max Gluckman The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence; and Ideas and Procedures in African
Customary Law; Holleman Shona Customary Law; John G Galaty and Pierre Bonte, Herders,
Warriors, and Traders: Pastoralism in Africa (1991). These works are only illustrative: this
literature is voluminous.
27 Albie Sachs Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) Chapter 9, 'Rights to Land'
104, 138. There is an extensive literature on the legal basis of apartheid. See, for example, Brian
Bunting The Rise of the South African Reich (1964). The land law of South Africa is not
primarily a product of apartheid, but dates back to British colonial law of the pre-apartheid era.
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Namibian Constitution recognizes the right of persons (almost entirely
whites) who acquired their lands in fee simple under apartheid era law to
keep those property rights, that principle does not impart only apartheid
era notions of property law into the Namibian Constitution. In fact the
principles enumerated in the preamble make clear that the opposite
presumption exists: all of the legal vestiges of apartheid are preemptively
rejected, unless they are specifically protected by the Constitution
because they serve some necessary social function. Property rights
acquired under apartheid are protected for clear political, economic, and
social reasons. But this has nothing to do with the Constitution's
protection of black and traditional property rights. At a minimum these
rights must be equally protected through Art 10.
Similarly, Art 131 prohibits repealing or amending any of the
provisions of Chapter 3 - Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
- so as to 'diminish or detract' from those rights and freedoms. The logic
of this section extends beyond the formal process of constitutional
amendment. Article 131 would also appear to support the proposition
that the rights enshrined in Chapter 3 cannot be 'diminished or detracted'
indirectly through overbroad and sweeping interpretations of other parts
of the Constitution.
Just as Art 10's equality provisions and Art 16's property guaranteesd
may be in contradiction without undermining the right to private
property, Art 21(g) freedom of movement and Art 21(h) freedom to
reside anywhere in Namibia may be in partial contradiction with Art 16
without detracting from Art 16's fundamental provisions. The right to
move or reside anywhere in Namibia does not give the right to move
across, or reside on someone else's property. Such rights to travel not
only say nothing about property rights of any kind, but cannot diminish
them in any way. If various property rights are alienated, then one might,
under Art 21, acquire some kind of a right to travel or reside there. But if
these same property rights are never alienated, no person has a right to
reside or travel there. Communal lands, like other forms of property, may
be subject to legislation governing various kinds of access or usages, even
expropriation (with compensation) in the national interest. But no
outsider has any more right under the Constitution to travel and reside
on those lands than on any other form of property.
The fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution are intended to
impose a limitation on governmental action: they cannot be abridged
except by the National Assembly in accordance with clear principles that
involve various national interests. 28 Any governmental attempt to assert
28 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs supra note 18, is the leading discussion of this complex
constitutional process of balancing fundamental rights and freedoms with other public
interests. The court distinguished fundamental freedoms from fundamental rights, entering
into a complex balancing process regarding Kauesa's freedom of speech that may not apply to
Arts 10 and 16, which are fundamental rights. The distinction that the Court makes between
rights and freedoms may well be mistaken.
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state ownership of communal, tribal, or other property rights is fully
subject to the provisions of Art 16. The language of Schedule 5 does not
circumvent Art 16, nor in any way define the meaning of Art 16. 'All
forms of property, moveable or immovable' protected under Art 16 were
not South African state property transferred to the Government of
Namibia under Schedule 5. This is true even if the apartheid-era
Government of South Africa which transferred that property to the
Government of Namibia in 1989 believed that, under its own laws,
communal or tribal land was 'owned' by the Government of South West
Africa.
B Trust Doctrine and the Legal Irrelevance of Fee Simple Ownership of
Communal Lands
A second, largely unrelated, framework of analysis would hold that the
actual governmental ownership of communal lands is irrelevant to their
disposition. Even if the government 'owns' those lands - a point not
conceded - the lands are held in a trust or quasi-trust relationship that
forbids their alienation except subject to a legally recognized native title,
protected under Art 16. This native title derives from either natural law,
the British or Roman-Dutch common law, or customary law, or any
combination of these sources. There is a voluminous literature on the
various sources of native land title that defies simple restatement. Some
of the easiest arguments to make follow from natural law. Under various
forms of European law virtually every single parcel of land in Africa
became the 'property' of some European nation, depriving the millions of
people who farmed, hunted, herded, or otherwise used those lands of any
property rights whatever, a proposition illegal when applied to the
various peoples within Europe, or later, to the various European peoples
who held land within Africa under European title. This legal process was
inherently unfair. It led to the creation of two systems of property
ownership, one for Europeans, well protected by law, one for Africans,
largely unprotected by law.
While all of the legal regimes of the European countries sanctioned this
dual system of land control all over the world in the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, an evolving body of international law
has begun to reject this colonial jurisprudence. Such cases as Spanish
Sahara, Mabo, Sparrow and Sioui have each proceeded to reject racist
and colonial jurisprudence, and begin to write a new jurisprudence of
native rights to their lands. 29 Whether or not Re Southern Rhodesia has
been overturned by a higher court, no one would argue that any of the
29 Advisor)' Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] ICJR 1; Mabo v State of Queensland (1991) 107
ALR 1; R v Sparrow (1990) IS CR 1075 and R v Sioui (1990) I SCR 1025. Mabo is a good
introduction to this literature.
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legal principles stated there are legally in force. 30 An early twentieth
century colonial court decision that holds that native people have no land
rights violates modern legal principles and therefore cannot stand - even
if it has never been expressly overruled by subsequent decisions or
statutes. This is true even without a policy statement as strong as the
Namibian Constitution's direct rejection of all legal principles that follow
from apartheid, colonialism, and racism.
The application of modern trust doctrine to native lands has not
generally been a product of statute law. Rather, common-law courts
faced with the problem of governmental encroachment on native lands
have derived trust doctrine from the complex nature of the relationship
between modern governments, tribal peoples, and tribal land tenure.
While it might take a formal legal instrument to create a trust, courts
have used the model of the trust to hold that a trust-like relationship
exists de facto between a government and its native people. This quasi-
trust doctrine substantially eliminates any need directly to decide the
issue of native ownership of communal lands. As long as this trust
relationship exists, the state must administer native land for the benefit of
the native people, and may not alienate that land except in ways
consistent with that trust relationship. 3 1 While this leaves the 'ownership'
question unresolved, it does accord a substantial measure of protection of
native land rights. Essentially, it divides the proverbial baby in half,
permitting the state to continue as if it 'owned' native land, but at the
same time it protects native land tenure from arbitrary interference by the
government. Native interests, for example, must be compensated if the
land is converted to uses inconsistent with their welfare.
In South Africa and South West Africa the trust relationship over
native lands was not judicially created, but statutorily created in the
South African Development and Trust Act of 1936 and in the South-
West African Native Affairs Administration Act, 1954. These trusts were
30 Lone Wolfv Hitchcock 187 US 553 (1903) holds that Indian land is not private property subject
to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without just
compensation. Without ever being explicitly overturned, this result has been simply
abandoned by American courts, including the United States Supreme Court in favour of
other doctrines, including the trust doctrine. Blue Clark Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, Treaty Rights
& Indian Law' at the End of the Nineteenth Century (1994) 107-111.
31 Common-law trust doctrine in relation to native lands was developed in the United States, and
later adopted in Canada. See Reid Peyton Chambers 'Judicial Enforcement of the Federal
Trust Responsibility to Indians' (1975) 27 Stanford LR 1213; Robert N Clinton 'Isolated in
Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self
Government' (1981) 33 Stanford LR 979; Note: 'Rethinking Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian
Law' (1984) 98 Harvard LR 422. The Canadian Supreme Court applies trust doctrine to Indian
lands in R v Sparroi (1990) IS CR 1075. The facts of that case are of interest in a Namibian
context. The Canadian government leased the lands of a British Columbia tribe to a private
golf course in the suburbs of Vancouver at a very low rate. The tribe sued the government for
damages. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the government had breached its duty as
trustee because it had a duty to administer those lands for the benefit of the Indian tribe and
awarded the tribe damages in the millions of dollars.
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extended in the various Representative Authorities Proclamations of
1980, identical laws that specifically put native land in trust for particular
native tribes, creating the various homelands in Namibia. The former
statute created the framework for preserving native reserves and was
primarily concerned with legalizing those reserves, defining land there as
belonging to the South African Development Trust, a governmental
agency created to hold and administer native lands held in trust for the
various tribes. This was extended to Namibia in the South-West African
Native Affairs Administration Act, 1954 which held in s 4(1) and (2) that
the land described in the Act was reserved for natives and was 'vested' in
the South African Development Trust established by s 4 of the
Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. This was the legal statement
of the status of communal lands in Namibia at that time, a legal status
that never changed between 1954 and Independence. Later legislation
altered Namibia's native reserves in different ways, but none of this
legislation touched on the question of the ownership of those reserves,
which was 'vested' in the Development Trust.32 This development trust
did not hold 'communal land' for the general benefit of all people, or
even all native people. Rather, it was held for the various members of
specific tribes.
Schedule 5 apparently recognized that such a trust relationship existed
by providing that 'all property of which the ownership or control ...
vested in the Government of the Territory of South West Africa or in any
Representative Authority constituted in terms of the Representative
Authorities Proclamation, 1980. . .' Unless these governments controlled
property that they did not own this language is redundant, and it is
presumed that no language in a constitution is redundant. This property
that either the Government of South West Africa or the various
Representative Authorities 'controlled' but did not own is not defined
elsewhere in Schedule 5 or the Constitution.
The distinction between 'own' and 'control' is clearly not a mistake
because later in Schedule 5 it specifically differentiates between
ownership and control in the form in which the Government of
Namibia takes land under this schedule: the property 'shall vest in or
be under the control of the Government of Namibia'. Obviously, only
land 'owned' by the Government of South West Africa, 'vested' in the
Government of Namibia. All land 'controlled' by that government or the
32 Some of these statutes 'vest' the Development Trust in a governmental official, an
administrator. Through Art 140 of the Constitution 'all powers vested by such laws . . in a
Minister or other official of the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed to vest in the
Government of the Republic of Namibia or in a corresponding Minister or official. ..
Following this language, it might be argued that the President of Namibia has succeeded the
various native administrators as 'trustee' of Native land. I have not addressed this issue, but
assumed that any government trust, no matter how administered, was a public trust and not
vested in any particular individual or office. In any case, for these purposes it makes no legal
difference which governmental office holds a governmental trust: it lies in the government.
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various Representative Authorities merely came under the 'control of the
Government of Namibia'. Lands in trust might be said to be 'controlled',
therefore it is difficult to imagine what else this clause refers to.
33
Whether created by statute or common-law usage, if the Government
of Namibia somehow 'owns' the communal lands, presumably a title
derived from its inheritance of Crown land, than it holds those lands in
trust. Any interest in property held in a trust, property of whatever form,
is a property interest held by the beneficiaries of the trust. Thus, interests
in property held by the native people who use communal lands are
protected under Art 16 of the Constitution as Art 16 protects 'all forms of
Property'.
34
III. THE CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, TRIBAL PEOPLES, AND
COMMUNAL LAND
There can be no question that the analysis thus far establishes a
significant blindness in the Namibian Constitution: a failure to either
recognize or explicitly protect communal lands, the most important
property rights of a majority of Namibian citizens. Ironically, this is true
whatever view one takes of the actual form of legal ownership of such
lands. Even if the state 'owns' communal land, it should provide for this
directly through the political process of constitution-making and not
derive its 'ownership' indirectly through conscious avoidance, tricks of
language, colonial law, or rules of constitutional or statutory construc-
tion.
This constitutional failing is part of a broader failing in the
Constitution to define tribal interests generally, including tribal or
communal lands, customary law, tribal government and governmental
sovereignty, and tribal culture. Again, depending on one's political views
on this question, this definition could properly take a variety of forms,
ranging from according a high level of constitutional protection to tribal
and customary matters, to simply recognizing that they exist in modern
33 The view had been advanced before the Supreme Court of Namibia by Advocate Jeremy
Gauntlett, arguing for the Government of Namibia in the Rehoboth Baster Gemeente and
Johannes Gerard Adolf Diegaardt v The Government of the Republic of Nanibia, appeal on II
October 1995 that the word 'control' was used because so much moveable property of unclear
title and origin was physically present in Namibia as a result of the war. Since the 'ownership'
of this property would be difficult or impossible to prove, the word 'control' was used. Even
assuming that Gauntlett's view is correct as to immovable property, it still leaves unsettled the
question of whether the word 'control' was used to apply to communal lands as well.
Gauntlett, in addition, represents the Government of Namibia in a communal lands case and is
clearly aware of the implications of the use of the phrase 'ownership or control' in this schedule
if it is applied to lands. Clearly, most of the 'property' covered by Schedule 5 was real property,
both buildings and lands, thus limiting the word 'control' to moveable vehicles and war
materials is a very narrow interpretation. In addition, the use of the Representative Authorities
in this section, specifically includes governmental bodies that administer native trust land and
do not 'control' large numbers of unregistered vehicles.
34 The Constitution never distinguishes 'private' property from other forms of property.
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Namibia and explicitly stating the extent of diminished tribal interests.
The drafters of the Namibian Constitution were aware that the legal
status of communal lands was left ambiguous. In the discussion of the
basic principles of the Constitution two parties raised the legal status of
communal lands as an important issue that needed to be directly
addressed in the Constitution.
M Muyongo of the DTA argued as follows:
Another thing that I want to make reference to is the fact that very important things...
were left out and that is the issue of communal land. In this Constitution there is no
reference to it, except customary and common law which, to my mind, don't tie in with
the very important issue of communal land. We have our people living in these areas, the
land belongs to them, but our Constitution has not made reference to it. So, Mr
Chairman, I wish to ask that a few of these issues be tackled again. . so we can allay the
fears of our people wherever they may be, that nothing that belongs to them is forgotten,
that nothing that belongs to them in terms of land is going to be snatched away in a
dubious manner.
35
J Garoeb of the UDF took on the same issue:
We believe that almost all parties represented in the Constituent Assembly are aware of
the importance and the sensitivity of the issue of communal land, but most of them have
until now skilfully evaded or side-stepped the issue ... The UDF wishes to address this
issue because we want this honourable House to be cognizant of the fears and concerns of
the traditional leaders and the vast majority of the people living on communal land....
[W]e thus believe, in the first place, that in respect of every tribe occupying communal
land, a trust should be established which will be a juristic person. Secondly, that the
affairs of each trust should be administered by the traditional authority of that tribe. In
the third place, that the ownership of the communal land occupied by the tribe
concerned, should be transferred from the government of the territory to the trust
established for that tribe.
36
No clear conclusions can be drawn from the fact that issues raised in
the Constituent Assembly were not acted on. However, the raising of
these issues does give rise to some helpful inferences about the meaning of
various ambiguous provisions. The most important inference is that all
present at the Constituent Assembly knew that there was a problematic
legal issue with the ownership of communal lands and that the majority
chose to address the issue indirectly through Article 100 or Schedule 5.
Therefore, the failure of the Constitution to clarify the question of the
legal ownership of communal lands was deliberate.
Since the actual process of drafting the Constitution was done in secret
and no minority reports and no minutes were kept of the sub-committees
that debated and drafted the different sections, nothing is known about
the reasons why Schedule 5 was not redrafted to deal explicitly with the
ownership of communal lands. 37 While some provisions of the
35 Namibian Constituent Assembly Debates, 21 November 1989 - 31 January 1990 vol 1, 166.
36 Ibid at 89-90.
37 Joseph Diescho The Namibian Constitution in Perspective (1994) 30.
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Constitution were vigorously debated on the floor of the Constituent
Assembly, 38 Schedule 5 was agreed to without discussion. 39 The
Namibian Constitution is a lengthy and detailed document, running to
eighty-one pages including schedules. It was the product of a complex
political compromise between a right wing, racist South African
government and a leftist, nationalist SWAPO government in exile,
brokered by the United Nations. As such it sets out a number of political
relationships in a very detailed way. There is no direct mention of tribes
as governments, tribal sovereignty or communal lands. However,
customary law is recognized in Article 38 to the extent that it is in
force and not inconsistent with the Constitution. Since apartheid era
South Africa recognized customary law, and since all South African law
remained in force, this concession to customary law is not only not
especially significant, it is irrelevant: customary law would have been
recognized anyway to the same extent is was recognized in South African
law. This constitutional silence on tribal or communal interests cannot
have been an accident given the length and detail of the Namibian
Constitution and the size and political importance of communal land
holdings.
The well-known Rehoboth Baster Communii case - still the subject of
litigation and really demanding a lengthy analysis of its own - is of
limited assistance in resolving the issues addressed in this paper.40 As it
stands, it may be simply wrongly decided. And as it is still the subject of
litigation, it is not particularly compelling precedent. More directly on
point, however, is that it refers to Rehoboth Baster community land
rights, which were specifically vested under South African rule in the
Government of Rehoboth, then ceded to the Government of Namibia in
Schedule 5, representing a transfer of vested land rights from a communal
basis to one government, then to another. The case turns on a provision
of the Self-Government Act that directly abolishes the Rehoboth Baster
Community on the ground that its government had ceased to function.
Neither of these provisions apply to communal land generally, traditional
land rights that are not 'vested' in any governmental authority. Similarly,
neither tribal nor community self government is protected under Article
16 as land rights are, and the two sets of rights are distinguishable under
the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
This recognition of communal land rights held on a tribal basis is not
without complex legal problems of its own that will require the attention
38 Ibid at 36-8.
39 Namibian Constituent Assembly Debates I February 1990 16 March 1990 vol 2. 40.
40 The Rehoholh Ba tergemeentle and Johannes Gerard Adotf Dieretardt v The Goveronent o/'e
Repmh"ic o'Namihia High Court of Namiia. unreported judgment delivered May 5. 1995. See
The Namihian 18 September 1995 at 3 for a discussion of the issues on appeal.
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of the National Assembly in the form of new communal land law. But the
need for further legislation to clarify, define, and administer these rights
is as irrelevant to the core issue of Art 16 protection of communal land
rights as an extensive need for laws to regulate problems of private
property ownership is irrelevant to the central protection of property
under Art 16. Legal interests in land are among the most complex legal
matters that exist in any human society, witness the complexity of the law
of property under either common law or Roman-Dutch law traditions.
However, this complexity is never used as an argument against the right
to private property.
The tragedy of the Namibian Constitution's slippery approach to
communal land is that it was unnecessary. Recognition of property rights
in communal land does not bring any great burden to Namibian
democracy. Most of the best land in the country is in private hands and is
fully protected by Art 16. Requiring the state to pay in full for communal
lands imposes only a small burden compared to that already imposed.
Not only is about 57 per cent of the usable land in private hands, but it is
the most expensive and developed 57 per cent.4 1 Black communal lands
not only amount to much less of the usable land - about 43 per cent - but
it is much less valuable land with less valuable improvements.
The solution is a simple one, one without major economic or political
costs: a carefully thought out recognition scheme, spelled out in the
Constitution or by statute, that includes all forms of traditional land
rights as protected by Art 16 rights under the Constitution, subject to the
same kind of expropriation (with full compensation) in the national
interest as other forms of property. Many of the vestiges of apartheid and
colonialism cannot be immediately redressed because of the constitu-
tional compromise that protects white property rights. The legal
recognition of the title of native people to their communal lands places
no such burden on the state: these lands are already in native hands. At
stake is the recognition of black land rights defined away through a racist
and colonial legal process, a process rejected on every level by the
Constitution of the new Republic of Namibia. Any 'large and liberal'
construction of that Constitution in the context of modern legal
interpretations of the land rights of native peoples must leave Namibia's
people with a legally recognized property right to their communal lands.
41 There are 6292 commercial farms, belonging to 6123 white owners and 181 black owners.
Prime Minister's Address. National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question.
Consensus Document, July 1991, Office of the Prime Minister, Windhoek, 4-5, 12.
